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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff seeks to uphold the ruling of the lower 
Court denying defendant's motion to set aside a default judg-
ment entered against Appellant which motion attacked the juris 
diction of the Utah Courts, both over the person of Appellant 
and the subject matter of the cause of action against Appel-
lant. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
Respondent obtained a Default Judgment against 
defendant for injuries and medical expenses on September 9, 
1975, in the District Court of Uintah County, the Honorable 
Allen B. Sorensen, District Judge. Appellant, on October 22, 
1975, filed a motion to set aside the default on the theory 
that the Utah Courts had no jurisdiction over him or to ad-
judicate Respondent's claim for damages because of the loca-
tion where the subject injuries were sustained. This motion 
was denied, from which this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the order denying the 
motion to set aside the default judgment sustained. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The subject injuries caused Respondent occurred 
on November 13, 1974, in Uintah County, Utah, at an area 
located approximately two miles south of Fort Duchesne, 
Utah (R. 22-25, certified copy of investigating officer's 
accident report). The road on which the accident occurred 
was formerly a public highway constructed, owned, and main-
tained by the State of Utah, and until May 1969 had been 
known as U-88. In that month, title was conveyed to Uintah 
County and thereafter has been a Uintah County owned and 
maintained public road (R. 30, Affidavit of L.R. Chester, 
Traffic Engineer, Department of Transportation, State of Utah). 
Defendant was personally served with summons within the State 
of Utah pursuant to Rule 4(d) and (e), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (R. 2,3) by a Uintah County Deputy Sheriff on July 
23, 1975. Stamped on the original summons is the following 
inscription and writing: "Authorized to serve papers on U. 
and 0. reservations (Uintah and Ouray), /s/ 7/21/75 (signature 
illegible) Judge" (R. 2). The motion of Appellant to set aside 
the judgment under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, can, in reality, only be predicated under Rule 
60(b)(5) "The Judgment is Void." 
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Exception is taken to Appellant's conclusion 
of law notwithstanding the fact that it is contained in 
an affidavit in support of Appellant's motion in the lower 
Court to the following statement: "Two miles south of 
Forth Duchesne, Utah, is located entirely within the 
exterior boundaries of the Uintah and Ouray reservation," 
and further, to the conclusion of law that the subject 
accident occurred "on a county road right-of-way," the 
same not being borne out by any fact contained in the rec-
ord in this case. (Emphasis added.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I ON APPEAL 
THE RECORD DOES NOT SUPPORT THE 
CONCLUSION THAT UTAH COURTS HAVE 
NO JURISDICATION OVER APPELLANT 
IN THIS CASE. 
Appellant assumes facts not in evidence when he 
states that the subject former State Highway U-88, now a 
Uintah County road, is a "right-of-way within the boundary 
of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation." The only evi-
dence of road ownership is contained in the previously re-
ferred to affidavit of a Utah State Department of Trans-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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-4-
portation Highway Engineer, who states in his affidavit 
affirmatively that Uintah County now owns the road. The 
reference to the exterior boundaries of the Uintah and 
Ouray Indian Reservation is not borne out by the record 
as judicial notice had been requested by Respondent for 
the trial Court to note that certain proceedings are 
pending in the United States District Court For the Dis-
trict of Utah entitled "The Ute Indian Tribe, plaintiff, 
v. The State of Utah, Duchesne County, a political sub-
division of the State of Utah, Roosevelt City, a municipal 
corporation, and Duchesne City, a municipal corporation", 
Case No. C-75-408, as filed in the United States District 
Court For the District of Utah. An examination of that 
file reveals an attempt by the Ute Indian Tribe to assume 
jurisdiction over all civil and criminal litigation occur-
ring within the old tribal boundaries which existed prior 
to the Proclamation of President Theodore Roosevelt of July 
14, 1905, 34, Statutes at Large, 3119, Proclamations (1905). 
That Presidential Proclamation referred to an Act of the 
57th Congress, 32 Statutes-at-Large 263, wherein the head 
of each Ute family was allotted 80 acres of irrigable land 
and each other member of the Ute Tribe was to be allotted 
40 acres of irrigable land of their choosings, and the re-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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mainder of the then existing reservation was to be ceded 
back to the public domain. Congress appropriated $70,064.18 
to compensate for claims effected by land allocations and land 
returned to the public domain, 32 Statutes at Large 264. 
Though this original allocation and payment required the 
"consent of a majority of the adult male Indians..." for 
approval and contained some reference to honoring of claims 
as the basis of arriving at this odd figure, the amount was 
subsequently ordered paid without majority Indian approval 
32 Statutes at Large 745. It is Respondent's position that 
payment of this compensation and the designation by tribal 
members of the acreage to be allotted to them effectively 
ceded the remaining property from the former boundaries, re-
linquishing jurisdiction in the Ute Indian Tribe over litiga-
tion arising off of reserved Indian grounds. The subject of 
the above referred to federal civil action in substance is an 
attempt by the Ute Indian Tribe to reinstate those boundaries 
which are commonly described by laymen as follows: 
"Drainage of the Duchesne River from 
the snowcapped mountains on the north to the 
snowcapped mountains on the south." 
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Appellant cites numerous cases defining the term 
"Indian country" as used in 18 U.S.C. §11.51 and rights-of-
way running through reservations as authority for their 
proposition that this County Highway is a right-of-way. 
Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 7 L. Ed. 2d 346, 
82 S. Ct. 424. If this were true, Highway 40, built on 
public domain by tax dollors with title vested in the pub-
lic, is merely a right-of-way without a grant of same, a 
proposition for which Respondent knows no authority any 
more than authority for the proposition that former U-88 
is a right-of-way. 
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 37 L. Ed. 2d 92, 
93 S. Ct. 2245 (1973) is distinguishable from this case, as 
the moneys derived from the homestead land sales were to be 
used for the benefit of the tribe and there was no Congres-
sional compensation for the unallocated grounds. Seymour v. 
Superintendent, supra, involved the State asserting juris-
diction over a crime. In that case, the north one-half of 
the Colville Indian Reservation had been vacated and re-
turned to the public domain by an 1892 Act of Congress sub-
ject to the existing allotments to individual Colville In-
dians. That Act reserved the south one-half for the use and 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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occupancy of the Colville Indians. A 1906 Congressional 
Act allotted 80 acres to each Indian, and a 1916 Presiden-
tial Proclamation placed the balance of the remaining south 
one-half in the public domain. The burglary charge arose 
in the south one-half. No compensation was afforded the 
Colville Indians for the reclaimed grounds except the home-
stead fee rights which were deposited to the credit of the 
Colville Indians, which is different than $70,064.18 paid 
by Congress over and above the homestead fee rights in-
volved with the Ute Tribe. Since the Utes were paid money 
for their land, Respondent believes the logical extension 
of the rationale of DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 
U.S. 425, 43 L. Ed. 2d 300, 95 S. Ct. (1975), is the 
controlling law for this case. In DeCoteau v. District 
County Court, supra, the United States Supreme Court was 
concerned with the cession of powers which was clearly 
spelled out at the time of acquisition back to the public 
domain of the unallocated lands. The Court noted that the 
Sioux Indians received compensation for these lands pursuant 
to an 1891 Act of Congress and affirmed the jurisdiction of 
the South Dakota State District Court to her child abandon-
ment proceedings involving an Indian child off of tribal 
lands, though within the 1867 reservation borders, and af-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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firmed the jurisdiction of the State District Court to . 
try Indians for criminal charges occurring off of lands 
but within the same borders for criminal offenses. 
The Court's attention is directed to Mescalero 
Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 36 L. Ed. 2d 114, 
93 S. Ct. 1267. At L. Ed. 119 the Court stated: 
"Absent express federal law to 
the contrary, Indians going beyond reser-
vation boundaries have generally been held 
subject to nondiscriminatory state law other-
wise applicable to all citizens of the state." 
Under this rationale, all of the cases cited in Points I 
and II of Appellant's Brief must necessarily be confined 
to their own fact situations as involving activities on an 
existing defined reservation, and this Court must decide 
only if the ancient boundaries of the 1800's are the reser-
vation boundaries or are the current myriad of allocated 
Indian land islands a multitude of small reservations? 
To decide the former is the law, effectively divides the 
applicability of the statutes of this State, such as 41-12-1, 
et seq., Safety Responsibility Act of Utah, notwithstanding 
the provisions of 41-1-1(v), Utah Code Annotated, making same 
obligatory on all drivers within this State. 
In the lower Court Judge Sorensen was requested in 
Respondent's Memorandum of Law (R. 29) to take judicial notice 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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of the anomalous situation which defendant and the Ute 
Indian Tribe finds itself in and would have this Court 
subscribe to. When Judge Sorensen was able to consider 
a case entitled "The Ute Indian Tribe, dba Utefab, Ltd. 
v. Hall, Inc., Civil No. 7751, as filed in the District 
Court of Uintah County from the caption in that case, it 
is apparent that the Ute Indian Tribe was seeking to in-
voke the jurisdiction of the State Courts to commence a 
civil action against a corporation doing business in Utah. 
In being consistent with Appellant's rationale, Hall, Inc. 
would have no right of counterclaim. The tribe also seeks 
to use the laws of this State to limit its civil liability-
Utefab, Ltd. (Emphasis added.) 
In summary, since tribal consent contemplated by 
63-36-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, has not been 
given to the State of Utah, to invoke and assume State juris-
diction over civil and criminal cases on Indian lands, and 
since the fair import of Appellant's position is that he is 
not subject to the laws of this State while on his lands 
(being the old reservation boundaries), Respondent suggests 
that maybe passports to leave those lands would be in order. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF UTAH HAVE 
JURISDICTION OVER APPELLANT AS HE HAS 
ENTERED A GENERAL APPEARANCE. 
As set forth in the Statement of Facts, an Indian 
Judge granted the Deputy Sheriff of Uintah County authority 
to serve the summons on the Appellant by the inscription on 
the face of the summons. Notwithstanding that fact, the 
Appellant has made a general appearance by attacking this 
Court's jurisdiction and by seeking affirmative relief. 
Brown v. Carnes Corp., Supreme Court of Utah, No. 14057, 
March 16, 1976, P. 2d , and Krofcheck v. 
Richards, Supreme Court of Utah, No. 14031, January 26, 1976, 
P. 2d . 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant merely assumes the mid 1800 tribal boun-
daries, if ever capable of being established with any degree 
of certainty, constitute the exterior perimeters of the juris-
diction of such tribal courts as may exist. He assumes a fact 
which is not borne out by any evidence, to-wit: a conclusion 
that former U-88 is a right-of-way. The record is void of 
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any evidence of the Utes receiving royalties from use of 
the public domain over which they now assert control, and 
for nearly 75 years the record is void of any exercising of 
domain over these lands or an open and notorious recogni-
tion of the nonowned Indian lands as being part of the res-
ervation grounds. Respondent believes the tribe to be the 
real party in interest, not the Appellant, who is allegedly an 
impecunious tribal member seeking to avail himself of the priv-
ileges of the Courts of this State and the laws of this State, 
but conversely seeks not to be bound by the laws if it is in-
convenient. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT M. vMcRAE 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
370 East Fifth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 364-6474 
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